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Abstract1 
In recent years, the search for regulatory regimes in order to effectively address human 
induced climate change have become a prominent political and academic issue. Emission 
trading schemes have risen in popularity and are widely believed to be an effective, as well as 
economically efficient, measure and have become a favoured government strategy. On the 
individual level, many individuals in the industrialised nations now undertake actions to offset 
their personal direct greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by voluntarily purchasing carbon 
credits, normally in association with product or service purchase. While this is a fast growing 
market, advertised as creating a carbon neutral consumer society, the voluntary carbon credit 
sector raises fundamental problems with respect to verification and credibility of the claimed 
offsets and associated projects. Lack of regulation and legal oversight leads to the 
impossibility of actually obtaining or verifying information on the consequences of voluntary 
credit purchases. Providers of offset credits who are driven by greed and easy profits will 
underfunded emissions abatement projects and pay little attention to quality standards. 
Corporate ‘green washing’ is also likely through voluntary offsets marketed as going carbon 
neutral. 
This paper connects voluntary offsets to psychological and behavioural impacts on the 
individual. We identify three specific issues: the psychology of marketing and purchasing of 
voluntary offsets, commodification and crowding out of intrinsic motivations and the implicit 
ethics with its own psychological implications. We also discuss the political economy of 
voluntary carbon markets and their geo-political implications in terms of the global North-
South divide and ethical responsibility for action on human induced climate change. This 
raises serious concerns over the individualisation of a collective problem, what can and 
should be expected of individuals as ethical consumers and how markets operate in practice. 
Such aspects place individual behaviour within a broader social and institutional context that 
questions the trend in market environmentalism and its impacts on the capability of humans to 
relate to nature. 
 
                                                 
1 A version of this discussion paper will appear in Alan Lewis (ed.) Cambridge Handbook of Psychology and 
Economic Behaviour. Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, the search for regulatory regimes in order to effectively address human 
induced climate change, by controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, have become a 
prominent political and academic issue. Emission trading schemes have risen in popularity 
and in the policy community are widely held to be an effective, as well as economically 
efficient, measure. They have become a favoured government strategy. Although carbon 
offsets have been developed as serious financial instruments in real markets, evidence has 
been accumulating as to their pervasive structural problems, negative social and 
environmental consequences and failure to actually address the reduction of GHGs that is 
supposed to be their raison d’être (Kollmuss et al. 2008; Spash 2010, 2015a, 2015b). 
 
Carbon markets exist in two general types: (i) regulatory markets under a compliance regime 
with formal rules for both trading and offsetting, and (ii) voluntary offsets sold via typically 
informal arrangements. Voluntary offsets are a fast growing market, but they also involve 
fundamental problems relating to the verification and credibility of the claimed emissions 
reductions. Proponents of voluntary carbon trading tend to argue, from a purely deductive 
theoretical perspective, that (re)design to match a market ideal can address all the problems 
(Caney and Hepburn 2011; Caney 2010; Page 2013). A key aspect is then how voluntary 
markets operate in practice. The actual projects related to these markets have been the subject 
of ongoing and unaddressed criticism including their negative social and ecological impacts 
that go beyond the carbon sequestering and GHG reducing aims. This raises a series of 
behavioural questions, such as: What do individual purchasers think they are doing, do they 
seek adequate information on consequences and if not why not (e.g. warm glow)? What role 
do voluntary offsets play in, for example, addressing dissonance? Is ethical concern a major 
motivator? Are intrinsic motivations enabled or removed? Our aim is not to answer these 
questions directly but to layout the terrain and suggest some likely answers through a mixture 
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of theoretical exploration, critical institutional analysis and review of and reflection upon 
practical and applied experience. 
 
The overall structure of this discussion paper is to start by reviewing the rise of emissions 
trading in general, before turning to voluntary markets in particular, and connecting their 
problems to the psychological and behavioural aspects of offset purchase. The critical review 
of voluntary carbon markets, their structure and functioning highlights the divergence 
between the expected and actual operation of voluntary markets in their role for achieving 
GHG emission reductions. We identify common commons problems as being a lack of 
information about and verifiability of actual emissions reductions claimed by offset providers. 
Why then are such markets expanding, what role are they performing for individual 
purchasers, and what are their implications for human behaviour? A range of issues arise from 
engaging individuals in such market based environmentalism. We focus on three specific 
issues, namely: the psychology of marketing and purchasing voluntary offsets, 
commodification and crowding out of intrinsic motivations, and the implicit ethics with its 
own psychological implications. The final section, before some concluding remarks, concerns 
the political economy of voluntary carbon markets and their geo-political implications in 
terms of the global North-South divide and responsibility for action on human induced 
climate change. This raises serious concerns over the individualisation of a collective 
problem, what can and should be expected of individuals as ethical consumers, and how 
markets operate in practice. Such aspects place individual behaviour within a broader social 
and institutional context that concerns how market environmentalism impacts the expression 
of value. 
 
Background to the Establishment of Carbon Trading 
The modern idea of controlling pollution emissions via trading in markets can be traced back 
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to academics in the United States of America (USA) writing in the 1960s. In general the 
literature developed from the promotion of private property rights as solving ‘externalities’ in 
the work of Ronald Coase (1960). More specifically the idea of pollution permit trading was 
originally proposed in a paper by Thomas D. Crocker (1966) and later elaborated in a book by 
John H. Dales (1968). Small scale markets for emissions trading were later introduced in the 
USA, but it took until the late 1990s before the idea of trading emissions became generally 
accepted and began to side-line other proposals such as direct regulation and taxes 
(MacKenzie 2009; Meckling 2014; Pearse and Böhm 2014). 
 
In the area of human induced climate change, this approach follows from the more general 
idea that establishing a price for carbon is the best means of ultimately reducing GHG 
emissions because it will correct market failures. Mainstream economic theory regards 
markets as the only institutional arrangement for achieving efficient resource allocation. 
However, operating efficiently requires that all activities are included in the market system. 
Thus, where pollution occurs this is described as a market failure because a lack of property 
rights means pollution is ‘external’ to the process of market decision-making. Internalising 
such ‘externalities’ is then a matter of getting the prices right and making economic actors pay 
for the use they make of the environment as a waste sink.2 This could be achieved by taxes. 
However, a regular argument is that emissions trading will achieve cost savings because 
markets are more efficient than government bureaucracies. As Bumpus and Liverman (2008, 
p.132) point out, carbon markets can be seen as “the newest arena for a market 
environmentalism that assumes that the way to protect the environment is to price nature’s 
                                                 
2 The concept of externalities has been challenged by Kapp (1978) as being a totally misleading description of 
how markets and the economy operate. Kapp explains environmental pollution, and a range of other problems, as 
arising from the deliberate shifting of costs on to others by economic actors. They do so for reasons of personal 
and corporate gain. The actions are not then external to the market as an institution. Rather than market failures 
they are market successes within the context of utility maximisation and profit seeking. Cost shifting is then the 
correct conceptualisation of the instituted process. 
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service, assign property rights, and trade these services within a global market”. It is then 
clearly a neoliberal policy instrument. In political economy terms it has been described as the 
“latest incarnation of an ongoing process of commodification and capitalist expansion” 
(Böhm et al. 2012, p.14). 
 
The idea of a market that buys and sells pollution permits is allied with the concept of 
offsetting pollution due to one activity by another that reduces pollution (i.e., creating a 
pollution credit). GHG offsets do not, as Broome (2012, p.85) notes, “remove the very 
molecules that you emit”. Offsetting more precisely refers to the ‘balancing out’ of some or 
all of the emissions generated by an organisation or individual (Page 2013). This occurs 
through reductions in emissions elsewhere in time and space. 
 
Polluters, whether organisations or individuals, pay a specified price to offset emissions. The 
market works because the price paid is lower than their willingness to pay for the action 
causing the emissions, or lower than the cost of reducing emissions directly (Bushnell 2012). 
Such trading is regarded as a form of market-based public policy instrument, founded on the 
idea that the reduction of pollution emissions is particularly efficient—least-cost—when 
individual actors are brought into situations of arbitrage and exchange. 
 
Carbon trading, in general, refers to the idea of mitigating human induced climate change 
through a market for GHGs that buy and sell emissions permits or credits. Such an emissions 
trading system (ETS) could be restricted to a set of polluters within a given jurisdiction who 
must either control their emissions directly or buy permits held by other polluters. Offsetting 
in this model occurs if polluters reduce their emissions enough to allow them to have an 
excess of permits to sell to others. Typically offsetting goes far beyond this. A theoretical 
description is that of Dhanda and Hartman (2011, p.120): “if someone performs an act that 
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adds carbon to the atmosphere, then offset providers perform an activity that reduces that 
equivalent amount of carbon in the atmosphere”. The fundamental idea behind carbon 
offsetting is that someone else is paid to avoid, absorb or reduce GHG emissions, which 
compensates for GHG emissions originating from the purchasers actions (Bayon et al. 2009; 
Kollmuss et al. 2008). These offset providers (or credit traders) may be outside the 
jurisdiction of the ETS or not be designated as polluters under the ETS. The offset purchasers 
may be those unable to meet their legal emissions reduction targets under a direct regulation. 
This is called compliance offsetting. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, but only effective from 2005 after sufficient countries 
ratified, was a major stepping stone that led to the establishment of both offsetting and ETS. 
Compliance offsetting was developed under two initiatives: the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) projects. The CDM and JI have been 
termed “flexible mechanisms” that allow industrialised countries (or Global North) to pay 
others in order to meet their international reduction targets to achieve avoidance of severe 
disruption to the Earth’s climate system. Under Article 2 of the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the 197 countries who are parties to 
the convention agreed to the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system” (United Nations 1992, p.4). Instead of reducing carbon emissions, Annex I 
countries are allowed to offset emissions via projects in non-Annex I countries.3 The original 
aim of these offset mechanisms was to promote technology transfer and assist with 
sustainable development only where unforeseen failures to reduce emissions occurred. 
However, the mechanisms have become used more broadly than that and, in contravention 
                                                 
3 “Parties included in Annex I” means a Party included in Annex I to the UNFCCC and covered 35 countries 
plus the EU15. 
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with the spirit of the agreement, for planning avoidance of domestic mitigation measures. 
Both mechanisms and their impacts on the effectiveness of ETSs have been the subject of 
close examination and criticism (e.g., Kollmuss et al. 2015; Spash 2010; Wara and Victor 
2008). 
 
Carbon offsets can be created through investing in a variety of projects. These can be broadly 
categorised into: (i) forestry and land use, (ii) renewable energy (iii) energy-efficiency, (iv) 
fuel switching and (v) methane capture (Broderick 2009; Gössling et al. 2007; Kollmuss et al. 
2008). Typically voluntary offsets for carbon emissions have involved carbon sequestration 
via reforestation and/or low carbon technologies (Ari 2013; Bayon et al. 2009; Bumpus and 
Liverman 2008). Regulated offsets have, in addition, involved projects that ‘destroy’ or 
prevent man-made GHGs such as hydrofluorocarbons. Indeed, projects do not need to reduce 
CO2 emissions, but can instead involve reductions in other anthropogenic GHGs such as 
nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4), chloroflurocarbons (CFCs) and hydroflurocarbons 
(HCFCs). Determining how much an increase in one GHG can be compensated for by the 
reduction in another requires establishing a common metric and basis of equivalence. 
 
CO2 equivalent (CO2e) is a quantity that describes for a GHG the amount of CO2 that would 
have the same global warming potential. CO2 as the numeraire is 1 and other GHGs are then, 
for example, CH4 at 25, N20 at 298, and HCFC-23 at 14800 times more powerful in their 
radiative forcing of the climate. This calculation of global warming potential requires a time 
horizon because different gases have different lifetimes over which they decay in the upper 
atmosphere; a normal horizon tat has been accepted is 100 years. These calculations to 
estimate equivalence are essential to making GHG emissions trading schemes functional; they 
establish the commensurability of different gases. A typical result is then to describe 
emissions in terms of tonnes of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) with markets trading certificates 
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representing this artificial quantity. 
 
Regulatory ETS markets are created as mandatory for a set of participants and can operate at 
regional, national or international levels. In the USA such markets are termed cap-and-trade 
systems. The theory is that an overall cap is set by a government authority or regulatory 
agency. Participants are allocated a certain amount of allowances, or permissions, to emit 
carbon based on staying under the overall cap. The cap should be binding, meaning that 
allowances are neither removed nor new ones created, but once created are available for 
trading. A prominent example of mandatory carbon markets is the European Union (EU) ETS 
“the first large-scale CO2 emission trading system in the world” often termed the “cornerstone 
of EU climate policy” (Knopf et al. 2014, p.2). It was introduced in 2005 after years of failure 
by the European Commission (EC) to get a carbon tax established because a consensus, that 
was necessary for passing such a financial instrument in the EU, could not be reached. In 
contrast, as an environmental measure the EU ETS did not require the same consensus. The 
switch meant the EU ETS could be established in an “ultra quick” negotiation period 
(Wettestad 2005). This was also aided by the low Kyoto Protocol targets easily met in Europe 
by sharing East European emissions reductions achieved by the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Spash 2016). That is Western Europe could offset their emissions on the basis of Eastern 
European emissions reductions through a joint EU emissions target. It is now in its third 
round of existence and neo-liberals and advocates of markets celebrate it as the successful 
transfer of climate change concerns into the “logic of the economic system” and an important 
step in the “right” direction (Rydge 2015). 
 
Yet, the EU ETS has also attracted considerable criticism due to its lack of environmental 
effectiveness (Knopf et al. 2014; Martin et al. 2014), failure to reduce GHG emissions (Koch 
2014), underlying political ideology (Bailey 2010; Grubb and Neuhoff 2006), wider negative 
9 
social and ecological impacts (Spash 2010), and the corruption and fraud that has been related 
to its operation including profiteering and racketeering which has been rife (Brinded 2012; 
Elsworth et al. 2011; Inman 2010; Jacobs 2013; Seager 2009). Rather than raising public 
funds, as would be expected by a tax, the free distribution of permits has passed billions into 
the hands of the biggest polluters (Coelho 2012; Fullbrook 2009; Gilbertson and Reyes 2009; 
Lohmann 2012). There are also concerns over the credibility of the offset projects. 
 
Besides schemes targeting firms and corporations, the idea has been floated of creating 
regulated personal carbon trading. This is defined by Fawcett and Parag (2010, p.329) as “a 
general term used to describe a variety of downstream cap and trade policies, which locate 
rights and responsibilities for the carbon emissions from household energy use and/or 
personal travel at the individual level”. Such schemes require mandatory participation by 
individuals, or households, and none have been implemented so far. This hypothetical idea 
has been discussed as a means of allocating personal carbon budgets to equitably distribute 
national, or international, targets on a per capita basis. These may then be traded or kept to 
offset personal/household emissions (see Capstick and Lewis 2010; Parag and Fawcett 2014; 
Starkey 2012a, 2012b). The per capita distribution is a key aspect regarded as producing 
equitable and just outcomes. 
 
The Development of Voluntary Carbon Markets 
Voluntary carbon offsets have developed in parallel with official and regulated ETSs. Guided 
by faith in the market system, voluntary offsets (like regulated ones) are promoted as creating 
price incentives for a low carbon economy based on consumer preferences expressed via 
willingness to pay. They are also linked with theories of ecological modernisation that 
promote the corporations as socially responsible agents in society who will freely adopt 
sustainable, ‘green’, business models for addressing environmental problems i.e., that 
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business is best at voluntarily controlling its own pollution (Rydge 2015; Spaargaren and Mol 
2013). 
 
Both regulated and voluntary offset markets have grown considerably since the establishment 
of the Kyoto Protocol with its promotion of trading as a flexible mechanism, and offsetting 
via the CDM and JI. By 2015 global trade under regulated ETS is estimated to have reached 
US$34 billion (World Bank Group and Ecofys 2015, p.13). Voluntary offset providers 
increased from a couple of dozen in 2006 to more than 170 in 2008, while the volume of CO2 
equivalent offsets increased from 24.6 to 123.4 Mt CO2e over the same period (Dhanda and 
Hartman 2011). During 2006 and 2008, the value of trade also increased from approximately 
US$97 million to US$705 million (Brinkel and Antes 2011). Peters-Stanley and Yin (2013) 
agree on the 2006 trade volume, but give a higher 2008 quantity of 135 Mt CO2e. They 
acknowledge the fall in annual trade volume, since the financial crisis, to 107 Mt CO2e in 
2009 and 101 MtCO2e in 2012, and Hamrick et al. (2015) also note the decrease in trade value 
to US$485 million in 2009 and US$379 million in 2013. Thus, voluntary carbon trading 
appears to be, like all financial assets, quite sensitive to economic cycles. Trade volume had 
fallen further by 2013, but increased 14% from 2013 to 2014 to 87 Mt CO2e with traded value 
rising by 4% to US$395 million. Almost 50% of the transacted volume for voluntary carbon 
offsets in 2014 was attributed to forestry and land use projects, 25% wind power projects, 5% 
to landfill methane, 5% cooking stove waste heat recovery projects and 10% ‘other’ (Hamrick 
et al. 2015). 
 
In contrast to mandatory schemes, voluntary markets are basically unregulated and outside of 
legally binding frameworks and State emissions control. Voluntary offsets are traded carbon 
credits issued by companies and civil society groups. Voluntary markets do not entail a finite 
or regulated supply of allowances, thee is no cap. Carbon credits (and associated offsets) are 
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actualised when a new project is implemented. The created credits can subsequently be 
bought by polluters (e.g. firms or individuals) to offset their emissions. Companies and 
individuals freely choose to purchase those credits to offset their emissions. 
 
Voluntary carbon markets are therefore separate from, or go beyond, any legal requirements 
for individuals or organisations to purchase emissions permits and have been advocated as 
testing grounds for innovative approaches for GHG reduction (Ari 2013; Bayon et al. 2009; 
Perdan and Azapagic 2011). Their role outside of official schemes has then been seen by 
some as a positive aspect and a means of taking independent action. In this latter respect they 
can extend emissions reduction where regulated markets have not been established (e.g. 
international flights), and encouraging small projects below the scale of regulated markets 
(Kollmuss et al. 2008). Indeed they originated in countries where governments were outside 
the Kyoto protocol and/or national policies failed to materialise (e.g. USA, Australia). 
Bumpus and Liverman (2008 p.132) point out that voluntary offsets emerged from 
“frustration with the lack of state action—when governmental policies were perceived to be 
slow, inadequate, or non-existent”. Voluntary carbon markets were, thus, in part promoted by 
non-profit organisations providing carbon offsets for pro-environmental individuals or 
organisations who were attempting to bypass the political blockades around the establishment 
of Kyoto emissions reductions. 
 
Yet, from the beginning, large GHG emitting corporations also participated in voluntary 
carbon trading. Among the first voluntary carbon offsets were investments in agro-forestry 
and forestry sequestration in Guatemala (1989) and Ecuador (1990) by US and Dutch 
electricity companies respectively (Bumpus and Liverman 2008 p.133). Corporations have 
also increasingly branded themselves as sustainable, environmentally friendly and ‘carbon 
neutral’. In 2014 globally about 150 corporations claimed that they used a carbon price for 
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internal management purposes with prices ranging from US$6 to US$89 per tCO2e (World 
Bank Group and Ecofys, 2015, p.48). In 2015 this had almost tripled to 435 corporations with 
internal prices ranging from US$1 to US$357 per tCO2e. Companies making such public 
declarations seem stimulated by the existence of government schemes with 94% located in 
countries where mandatory pricing (ETS or tax) is in place or proposed (World Bank and 
Ecofys 2016). Appearing ‘green’ may therefore be a strategic manoeuvre to pre-empt GHG 
emission legislation that is expected to be more stringent and costly (Spash 2010; 
Spiekermann 2014). 
 
Green branding, image creation and product marketing are also important drivers for the 
corporate purchase of voluntary carbon offsets (Brinkel and Antes 2011; Bayon et al. 2009). 
Ari (2013, p.911) points out that “private companies use the wording ‘carbon neutral’ in their 
products, events and activities by buying carbon credits to offset their associated emissions”. 
This helps to neutralise public perception of environmental harm for companies with a large 
carbon footprint. Offsetting emissions to become ‘carbon neutral’ can contribute to an image 
of corporate social responsibility. That corporations promote and advertise carbon neutrality 
helps normalise the idea that this is both a legitimate response to human induced climate 
change and a ‘good’ thing to do. This then encourages individuals to adopt a similar 
behaviour and ethical stance. 
 
Three types of buyers can then be distinguished in the voluntary GHG market sector: (i) 
middlemen, (ii) corporate/business, non-governmental and local community organisations and 
(iii) individual/household consumers. Middlemen purchase carbon offsets to trade them and 
may put out calls for carbon projects and propose carbon financing to fund projects. They 
trade permits for profit and may also engage in price speculation. The organisational and 
individual types of purchasers may have similar motives to each other, from promoting self 
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image to genuine concern for mitigating GHG impacts. While households and individual 
consumers are passive purchasers of offsets, organisations may proactively approach offset 
providers and suggest projects. 
 
There are two forms of voluntary permit trading: direct and via a financial exchange. The 
majority of voluntary carbon trades are over-the-counter transactions, where buying and 
selling is conducted directly (Bayon et al. 2009; Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013). For example, 
travellers booking a flight might buy offsets directly from an airline along with their plane 
ticket. The direct character of such transactions means the price is often hidden from the 
customer or hard for them to estimate (Bayon et al. 2009). The other form of trading is via 
official exchanges and a formal trading platform. The Chicago Climate Exchange is an 
example of such a system. In this case price data is typically closely monitored (not least by 
traders) and recorded. Yet even here information about what exactly is represented by an 
offset credit can be far from transparent. As a result prices for CO2 vary substantially. Several 
authors have reported that the cost of offsetting one tCO2e in voluntary markets generally 
ranges from a few to around thirty Euros, with some suppliers charging up to €180 per tCO2e 
(Brinkel and Antes 2011; Dhanda and Hartman 2011; Schiermeier 2006). What lies behind 
price differences and more generally what goes on in voluntary markets is often unclear. 
Comparability of offsets (in addition to any issues of carbon equivalence) is affected by 
considerable variety in the methods used for offsetting, project types and suppliers. 
 
Unregulated Carbon Markets: Information and Validity 
In this section we review a range of concerns about how voluntary markets operate. This 
critical institutional analysis brings to the fore the divergence between a theoretical model of 
the fully informed consumer and the operation of actual voluntary markets where information 
on offsets is opaque or lacking, as will be explained. This sections sets the stage for the 
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following enquiry into who is prepared to buy such an ill-defined product and what is their 
justification and motivation for doing so? First let us establish how ill-defined is the product. 
 
Voluntary carbon markets lack governmental regulation and oversight—accordingly they 
have been termed “Cowboy markets” (Roy and Woerdman 2012, p.9). Without a regulatory 
body various forms of carbon credits have appeared that go under a number of titles (e.g., 
verified emission reduction, voluntary emission reduction, voluntary carbon unit, or just 
emission reduction units). Providers may engage in product differentiation purely for 
marketing reasons. This leads to comparability problems. That is, how are consumers meant 
to understand the differences, if any, between the various offset products? Is expecting the 
individual purchasers to be, or become, fully informed at all realistic? 
 
A related concern then arises as to quality standards, especially with regard to the conditions 
ensuring implementation and control mechanisms. Kollmuss et al. (2008) survey different 
types of standards, which aim to guarantee the credibility and accountability of offsets. 
However, they found that offset standards differ substantially in accounting, monitoring and 
verification methods as well as enforcement systems. In a study of over 100 carbon offset 
providers, Dhanda and Hartman (2011) come to a similar conclusion that the standards are 
inconsistent and non-comparable. The attempts to provide a quality control standard covering 
different providers has also proven problematic. For example, the Voluntary Offset Standard 
screens and evaluates offset credibility, but this has itself been criticised for having vague 
screening criteria, an unclear evaluation process and lack of detailed specific information 
(Kollmuss et al. 2008). 
 
The Chicago Climate Exchange has implemented specific rules in order to ensure the quality 
and ecological integrity of offset projects. However, in an international survey, Brinkel and 
15 
Antes (2011) find that market participants vary in their assessment of Chicago Climate 
Exchange’s standards. While some of their respondents state that the requirements laid down 
are sufficient and ensure the proper working of offsetting mechanisms, others criticise the 
Exchange’s lack of transparency and failure to disclose information. Kollmuss et al. (2008) 
also reference substantive criticism which questions the additionality of some Chicago 
Climate Exchange offsets. 
 
Additionality refers to the need for emissions reductions to make a difference over business as 
usual. That is, if say a reforestation project were going to be undertaken anyway, without the 
offset funding, then there is no addition of carbon emissions reduction compared to what 
would have occurred in any case, i.e., under business as usual. There is then no justification 
for payment under economic efficiency criteria and no net reduction in emissions, indeed 
exactly the opposite will occur if permits are sold on the basis of a project violating 
additionality. 
 
Another attempt to provide a quality criteria is the Gold Standard. This was established by the 
World Wide Fund for Nature to address concerns over the environmental and social integrity 
of projects. It is the only voluntary standard that has clearly defined additionality rules and 
requires third-party auditing. Thus, it is “generally accepted as the standard with the most 
stringent quality criteria” (Kollmuss et al. 2008, p.57). As a result, Gold Standard certification 
requires extensive documentation of the project. However, this also considerably increases the 
costs for those designing and implementing offset projects. The cost differential, relative to 
lower quality offsets, has implications for the adoption of high quality standards in an 
unregulated price-making market. As Spash (2010) notes, where standards are unenforceable 
(i.e., voluntary) all certificates are regarded as equally valid, and poor quality cheap offsets 
will drive out the high quality expensive ones; that is how price-making markets operate. 
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Thus, a general problem with the Gold Standard, and similar schemes, in a competitive price-
making market, is that they are very likely to be undercut and sidelined. 
 
The majority of offset providers use self-developed offset standards and verification processes 
instead of adopting the Gold Standard guidelines or other third party standards. Sterk and 
Bunse (2004, p.16) suggest that: “one feature that is indispensable is the auditing of projects 
by independent third parties; otherwise the compensation cannot be regarded as credible”. 
Yet, this is not the norm and the quality and credibility of such self-developed standards has 
remained unclear and difficult to judge (Taiyad 2005). 
 
Similarly, the validity of additionality is often highly problematic to establish. Several cases 
exist where the additionality of projects have been questioned and there is a lack of explicit 
justification in the project documentation (Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Dhanda and Hartman 
2011). More fundamentally, Kollmuss et al (2008, p.89) argue that additionality is based on 
the idea that: 
“emission reductions have to be measured against a counterfactual reality. The 
emissions that would have occurred if the market for offsets did not exist must be 
estimated in order to calculate the quantity of emissions reductions that the project 
achieves.”  
Such a hypothetical reality is always sensitive to determining what would have happened in 
any case, i.e., baseline scenarios. Carbon offsets should be actual reductions of emissions that 
would not have occurred otherwise, rather than arbitrary paper projections. Worse offset 
projections are likely to be manipulated by providers to serve their own interests, and this 
includes claiming consequences are certain and known. 
 
The verification of projected and claimed carbon offsetting is difficult to establish and subject 
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to both considerable wishful thinking as well as deliberate exclusion of risk and uncertainty. 
For example, the planting of forests to achieve carbon sequestration involves considerable 
unpredictability. Research has questioned the effectiveness of forestry as a means of carbon 
sequestration and it is subject to being overstated (Dhanda and Hartman 2011). The actual 
amount of carbon sequestrated depends upon the specific growth rates of the trees, their age, 
soil conditions and the local climate. Unforeseen events can and do intervene including 
human activities and natural disasters (e.g. drought, forest fires, hurricanes, flooding) which 
harm or destroy forests. However, predicting carbon sequestration rates on the basis of future 
growth projections is necessary in order to sell carbon credits before any actual sequestration 
has occurred. The promise is that trees will be planted in the future on the basis of payments 
made for past emissions or emission to be released immediately (Bumpus and Liverman 2008; 
Lohmann 2010). 
 
In general, projects claiming GHG emissions reductions and avoidance face major 
ambiguities and uncertainties. Projected savings in GHG emissions require ensuring actual 
implementation as well as maintenance and repair of any associated project equipment and 
infrastructure. Legislative hurdles and local opposition to projects add political indeterminacy 
(Brinkel and Antes 2011). There is additional social indeterminacy due to the difficulty of 
fulfilling expected outcomes and the vagaries of human behaviour. That is, for example, 
economists’ limited models of human behaviour fail to account for the rich array of potential 
responses because they assume a single simple causal mechanism (i.e. self-interested greed or 
more formally utility maximisation and its underlying preference utilitarianism). Actual 
behaviour results from a mixture of motivators, causal powers and tendencies. Social norms 
and cultural practices, that are absent from the economic model, are clearly important aspects 
of actual behaviour. 
 
18 
Thus, like forestry, carbon emission reductions due to renewable energy and energy efficiency 
are also far from self-evident and dependent upon human practices. Energy efficiency projects 
are often small scale and difficult to monitor and evaluate, e.g. distribution of energy efficient 
light bulbs in Australia treated as GHG reducing offsets, although not used, or hoarded, by 
households (Spash 2010). Lambe et al. (2015) in their study on cooking stove projects in 
Kenya report major uncertainties about the uptake and usage rates of the stoves. Determining 
the actual amount of carbon saved from distributing cooking stoves depends on several 
assumptions about cooking behaviour, changes in practices and fuel switches, which the 
authors find highly arbitrary in existing emissions reduction methodologies. There were 
several mismatches between the assumptions of international investors compared with local 
communities and non-governmental organisations working in the field. For example, Lambe 
et al. (2015) found divergence between how cooking stoves were used in the Kenya project 
and the assumed use based on practice in the global North. This led to a mismatch between 
enforcing the efficiency needs of a carbon project and cultural practices. Such cooking 
practices might relate to types of food affecting the length of cooking times and intensity of 
heat during cooking (e.g. cooking food all day on a low heat versus heating food for a short 
time with a more intense heat). 
 
Typically, the energy savings resulting from such projects are calculated by comparing them 
to a hypothetical baseline scenario of using a fossil fuel intensive alternative. The investor as 
well as the project host have an incentive to overstate such scenarios to maximise the claimed 
gains. The decentralised and geographically distributed sites involved in such projects adds to 
the difficulty of establishing the baseline scenario necessary to estimate emissions and to 
monitor the reductions. The emissions reduction of cooking stove projects, for instance, is 
estimated based on small samples extrapolated to heterogonous communities (Bumpus 2011; 
Kollmuss and Bowell 2007). 
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Another issue with respect to the inconsistency of carbon accounting relates to carbon 
footprint calculators, which are widely employed by individuals to inform themselves about 
their potential environmental impact relating to the enhanced Greenhouse Effect. They may 
also be linked to providers’ websites or incorporated into the product purchase process. Such 
calculators vary widely in their estimates of the impact from the same person or activity 
(Murray and Dey 2009; Schiermeier 2006). For example, in a comparison of different carbon 
credit providers, Schiermeier (2006) found that estimates of carbon emissions for the same 
flight varied from 2.1 to 6.9 tonnes of CO2. Emission calculation methods vary so that one 
company only considered direct emissions emitted per passenger, while another included 
effects on ozone and climate. Dhanda and Hartman (2011 p.126) cite the case of a flight from 
Chicago to Melbourne estimated at anything from 3.8 to 8.0 tonnes of CO2 costing from $48 
to $267 to offset. 
 
Brinkel and Antes (2011) argue that the pinning down of exact numbers is difficult because 
the actual amount of carbon emitted by companies depends on a variety of factors. For large 
companies calculating carbon emissions can be extremely complex due to the extent and 
variety of their operations so that producing reliable estimates requires numerous 
assumptions. In order to go ‘carbon neutral’, via offsets, a company needs to measure the 
GHG emissions it is producing. The critical literature on environmental accounting has 
questioned the data reliability disclosed by companies (Boiral and Henri 2015; Hopwood 
2009). Based on an in-depth study of Canadian industry using qualitative interviews, Talbot 
and Boiral (2013) found the complexity of measuring corporate GHG emissions meant claims 
being made remained highly uncertain, opaque and imprecise. They concluded that: “The 
majority of businesses do not have confidence in their own [GHG] inventory and even less in 
that of their competitors” (Talbot and Boiral 2013, p.1082). 
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The result may be either under-estimation or over-estimation of GHG emissions as seems 
strategically convenient depending upon the institutional and regulatory context. For example, 
high GHG emissions scenarios may be projected to allow justification for claiming larger than 
actual reductions are achieved (Downie 2007). Under regulatory ETS with grandfathering 
exaggeration of emissions is incentivised in order to obtain free permits that can later be sold 
on the open market without any need to undertake pollution control (Spash 2010). In contrast, 
under unregulated markets, offset providers may claim their projects achieve very low 
emissions (i.e. underestimate actual emissions) in order to sell more offsets from larger 
overall emissions reductions than actually occur. As outline above, this has indeed been the 
case for forestry and energy offset projects. 
 
In summary, unregulated voluntary markets incentivise the provision of low quality offsets. 
Bushnell (2012) argues that moral hazard is a likely problem because information is 
essentially an offset project developer’s private property. Moral hazard means acting 
immorally is incentivised. Here the offset provider is incentivised to lie to make profits. 
Furthermore, adverse selection might be pervasive because offset markets will be particularly 
attractive to firms whose baseline scenarios prove to be lower than originally estimated or 
projected. This means projects are selected (moral hazard), or firms opt-in (adverse selection), 
due to the ease of assuming additionality where there is none. Both problems bring into 
question the claims made for offset markets, but also pose the question as to why do 
individuals buy offsets? Do they lack information on and awareness of the problems or do 
they just not care? 
 
Effects on Individual Behaviour 
As has been explained there are numerous problems with offsets and their validity as a means 
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for reducing GHG emissions. However, the expectations of voluntary markets is that the 
consumer, or permit purchaser, will be able to evaluate all relevant information. The 
foundation for this positions is an economic model where consumers have perfect information 
and make choices on the basis of perfect foresight of all consequences. This is a highly 
simplified and misleading conceptualisation of human choice in price-making markets and 
also neglects the interactions between human behaviour and institutional context (e.g. rules, 
regulations, norms). In this section we explore how three aspects of voluntary markets impact 
on individuals, namely via playing on their psychology, crowding out intrinsic motivation and 
promoting a specific ethical approach to environmental problems. 
 
5.1. Psychology of voluntary offsets 
Two issues that have been hypothesised to contribute to greater awareness of personal GHG 
emissions and incentivising their reduction are “increased visibility” and “cognitive 
availability”. Both are discussed by Capstick and Lewis (2008) for the case of compulsory 
personal allowances with carbon trading, but seem potentially relevant to voluntary offsetting. 
Visibility refers to the revelation of information that was previously hidden or difficult to 
attain, e.g., displaying the amount of carbon emissions at the point of sale. Cognitive 
availability is where the display of such information “has the potential to act as an additional, 
novel form of feedback” (Capstick and Lewis 2008, p.8) leading to a change in behaviour. 
Such an effect has been claimed for the case of household energy (Capstick and Lewis 2010; 
Darby 2008; Lewis and Brandon 1999). For example, electricity customers are supplied with 
a digital display connected to a meter which is meant to be located in a prominent place to 
encourage reduced energy consumption. However, as has been explained, the information 
supplied in carbon offsetting is nothing like as reliable as that available from a household 
electric or gas metering system. Neither does voluntary carbon offsetting involve action to 




The heterogeneity of consumers explains why voluntary offsets are able to operate within 
specific market segments and achieve price discrimination between different consumer 
groups. Take the example of flying. Burns and Bibbings (2009) use the derogatory term ‘New 
Puritans’ for people who take a critical stance on environmentally threatening consumption by 
refraining from flying altogether. More generally, the term ‘deep Green’ may be used to refer 
to those who aim to avoid and refrain from certain actions such as fossil fuel combustion and 
the resulting GHG emissions. The individuals being identified here are not then interested in 
buying permissions to undertake such actions. Similarly, the climate denialists and those who 
just “don’t care” will not purchase offsets at all. Spash (2010 p.186) has therefore 
hypothesised that this leaves as the primary marketing target the “moderately environmentally 
concerned consumer”. This is a person who weighs-up the consequences and feels a need to 
assuage guilt over wrong doing by balancing harmful acts with good acts. The existence and 
availability of offsets allows the moderately environmentally concerned consumer to purchase 
permission to perform a specific environmentally harmful action rather than avoid that action. 
Thus, the widely acknowledge environmentally harmful behaviour of flying can be 
compensated for by purchasing offsets. Many airlines offer voluntary carbon offsets directly 
when purchasing tickets. Mair (2011) studied voluntary carbon offset purchasers in the UK 
using an online questionnaire. Among those who were offsetting emissions from aviation, 
most were driven by pro-environmental attitudes. However, frequent reasons for offsetting 
were the lessening of guilt and the ease of doing so. McLennan et al. (2014) in a survey of 
international visitors to Australia found that purchasers of voluntary carbon offsets for 
aviation are to a large extent ‘nature based visitors’, i.e. travelling to Australia to undertake 
whale or dolphin watching, rainforest walks and visits to wildlife parks, zoos or aquariums. 
This supports the hypothesis of Spash (2010) that purchasers of voluntary carbon offsets are 
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“moderately environmentally concerned consumers”. Yet, despite their apparent 
environmentalism, some such individuals may actually ignore the implications and outcomes 
of their offset purchases. 
 
Where individuals are driven by a ‘warm glow’ and guilt avoidance, there is limited concern 
for the actual environmental consequences of their purchase (Andreoni 1989, 1990). Kotchen 
(2009) notes that is it the ‘warm glow’ of good feeling and the ‘reputational boost’, that play 
an important behavioural role when purchasing carbon offsets. People who buy offsets for 
such reasons engage in conspicuous consumption and therefore wish to show-off their carbon 
offsets purchases e.g., making use of window stickers. Thus, emissions reduction is 
transformed into a means of achieving social status as a ‘good’ person instead of being an end 
in itself. Carbon providers sell the ‘feel good factor’ and guilt reductions of carbon credits 
rather than the actual GHG abatement (Spash 2010). 
 
Ignorance about the effectiveness of the purchased offset is then unproblematic and the 
purchaser is similarly unconcerned over harmful side effects of projects, at least as long as 
they remain unknown. There is certainly no desire to discover more about such things. This 
fits well with carbon markets because they do not directly transfer a tangible good or service 
to the consumer, there is no actual consumption by the purchaser, nor any physical product to 
inspect for quality. Meanwhile offset providers are driven by making money and that means 
finding the cheapest low quality offsets and overstating project emissions reductions, which as 
has been explained is easily done. 
 
Spiekermann (2014) doubts the motivation behind participating in carbon offsetting and 
argues that there are strong signs that buying offsets is mainly to clear ones conscience. He 
argues that many of the participants of voluntary schemes would be unwilling to pay higher 
24 
prices to justify their unsustainable consumption practises. They participate because it is 
cheap and easy to do so. This point is also illustrated by Lohmann (2006a). He recounts the 
story in an article that appeared in the Daily Telegraph, a British right wing newspaper. The 
article concerned a business executive reporting her experiences with carbon footprint 
accounting. She discovered that her carbon footprint was about 24 tonnes of CO2, which was 
a great relief to her because the amount necessary to pay for carbon neutrality was minor 
compared to even trivial other expenditures that she commonly undertook. 
 
Spiekermann (2014) regards such offsetting as undermining the duty one has to reduce carbon 
emissions. He questions the “robustness of motivation” behind voluntary carbon offsetting, 
which would disappear if prices rose, and speculates that such a price rise should occur as 
offsetting successfully increases demand while reducing carbon emissions. Thus, 
Spiekermann (2014, p.927) states that the: 
“lack of robustness in the offsetting system matters: the system fails as an institution 
because it would be undermined by its own success. Perhaps even worse, it creates 
incentives and price signals that convey the impression that climate neutrality could be 
easy to achieve for everyone without sacrifice.” 
Hymans and Fawcett (2013, p.96) basically agree and question the motivation individuals 
have for participating in carbon offsetting stating that “motivation is rather weak, and 
disappointingly easily defeated by other interests”. They argue that on the basis of such a 
weak motivational foundation carbon offsets cannot offer a general solution to human induced 
climate change. 
 
Two implications are worth highlighting here. First, such offset purchasers are not particularly 
motivated to assess the reliability and additionality of offsets. They avoid the psychological 
costs of questioning offset credibility. Maintaining their belief that offsets are beneficial 
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addresses their cognitive dissonance (Spash 2010). This conjecture is supported by a survey 
of green tourism in the context of climate change by Becken (2004, p.341). She found that: 
“A preferred way of avoiding the dissonance resulting from actual behaviour and pro-
environmental attitudes is to contribute financially (and therefore internalise 
externalities), while keeping the privilege of continuing current practices”. 
If the primary motive is to preserve ones lifestyle then the extent to which actions have real 
results is at best secondary. This lack of concern over quality and actual consequences of 
offset purchases means projections of emissions reductions can more easily “prove to be 
illusory” (Hymans and Fawcett 2013, p.96). Second, taken together with the dubious 
foundations of many offset projects, this results in a “principal-agent problem”, i.e., the 
purchaser, or principal, cannot observe the actions of offset provider, or agent (Spash 2010). 
The low quality of offsets is hardly noticed and can stay unpunished. The different standards 
and rating systems of carbon offsets only adds more confusion that makes such an outcome 
even more feasible. 
 
Ecological modernisation has also been cited as culpable in spreading the ideological 
commitment to offsetting as a legitimate response from businesses that results in neglecting 
actual conduct in the marketplace. In a study of the paucity of regulation in the voluntary 
carbon trading sector, McKie et al. (2015, p.477) report that activities in the market “include 
the false selling of carbon credits, exploitation of weak regulations, tax and security fraud, 
money laundering and internet crimes”. This has resulted in investigations of such markets by 
Interpol and the UK Financial Conduct Authority. Trading companies use marketing and 
advertising techniques that promote sustainability, play on beliefs in ecological modernisation 
and concerns over ethical conduct in their attempts to cover traditional fraud and theft. McKie 
et al. (2015, p.483) argue that “motivated offenders and victims come together in the 
marketplace because ecological modernisation ideology is such a strong behavioural driving 
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force”. A world ideologically committed to trust in business and markets appears to create a 
blindness to how those same markets are used to achieve ulterior motives and fail to fulfil 
their promises. 
 
On a behavioural level, it is quite likely that carbon offsets solidify and lock-in unsustainable 
consumer practices, rather than changing consumption patterns, because negative effects on 
the climate are perceived to be neutralised. Gössling et al. (2007, p.241), for instance, state 
that voluntary carbon offsets carry the “risk of encouraging people to believe that they need 
not change their behaviour, thus creating irreversibility in current consumption and 
production patterns”. Cohen et al. (2011), in reporting interviews with regular air travellers, 
note the expressions of guilt over conducting behaviour known to have negative consequences 
for the environment, but that voluntarily offsets relieved this tension and were regarded as a 
useful neutralisation strategy that enabled interviewees to continue flying on a regular basis. 
Similarly, in a survey of self-selected green consumers, McDonald et al. (2015) found, when 
exploring reasons for continuing to fly, that interviewees discussed purchasing carbon offsets 
instead of changing their behaviour. Voluntary carbon offset provision can act as a means for 
justify environmentally harmful consumption while eroding social norms against such acts. 
 
Lohmann (2008) argues that carbon offsetting convinces high emissions consumers to see 
their emissions simply as unavoidable instead of contributing to a consumption pattern that 
needs to be changed through individual and collective action. In this way it: 
“hides the roots of climate change—that is, the historical overuse and skewed use of the 
Earth’s carbon cycling capacity by a global minority—as well as other systemic social 
and technical processes” (Lohmann 2008, p.363) 
Hence, well-developed carbon offset markets can jeopardise public support for binding limits, 
carbon taxes and the introduction of cleaner technologies. Carbon offsets carry the risk of 
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locking-in unsustainable practices instead of contributing to the actual behavioural changes 
necessary to reduce carbon emissions in industrialised nations and consumer economies. The 
argument here is that, while carbon markets might be able to collect some ‘low hanging 
fruits’, in doing so they hinder more profound changes (Broderick 2009; Lohmann 2008). The 
availability of carbon offsets individualises and isolates responsibility for human induced 
climate change while simultaneously reducing collective psychological controls. This 
individualisation of responsibility also inhibits serious debate over the necessity of large scale, 
social ecological transformation. 
 
Carbon offsets might even lead to behaviour that generates more emissions. Spash (2010) 
further illustrates this point. Evidence from the consumption of food products and enhanced 
safety features show that individuals are encouraged to increase their overall food 
consumption because they now eat ‘healthy food’, and take greater risks because they use 
better safety features. Hence, providing technical fixes as substitutes for behavioural change 
can produce the opposite of intended outcomes. 
 
 Commodification of carbon and crowding out 
A concern related to the preceding discussion is that transforming emissions into tradable 
commodities might crowd out intrinsic environmental motivation and erode individual action 
to protect the climate. In contrast to mainstream economic understanding, several studies have 
shown—theoretically and empirically—how extrinsic incentives, such as pricing, can crowd 
out the intrinsic motivations which underlie voluntary actions (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 
1997; Frey 1997; Rode et al. 2015). A central reason for crowding out is that individuals hold 
a variety of motivations and values other than preference utilitarianism (Spash 2000a, 2000b, 
2006). Decision-making is also recognised as a realm where non-monetary motivations play 




A major psychological process of crowding out is that external incentives are perceived as a 
constraint on the possibility to act autonomously. An individual’s sense of responsibility and 
control decreases, replaced by economic rationales and self-interested behaviour (Bowles 
2008; Frey and Stutzer 2012). Carpenter (2005) finds that decisions which take place in 
market settings erode social preferences. The anonymous and competitive setting of markets 
creates an atmospheres that weakens social control, to achieve collective action. This is also 
supported by Kerr et al. (2012) who find that in the case of a low price for buying an offset (as 
found in voluntary carbon markets) fewer people are likely to participate in collective actions 
to address the same issue. 
 
Vatn (2005) argues that people only have well-defined preferences for a few types of familiar 
goods. For others, and in this case particularly environmental ‘goods’, preferences are often 
unclear and socially contingent. This means that institutional arrangements that promote 
autonomy, trust, and social preferences are able to crowd-in intrinsic motivations (Frey and 
Stutzer 2012; Frey 1997). The institutions of the market place are then aimed at promoting 
exactly the wrong type of values in society (Spash 2010). 
 
On top of these concerns the extent to which Nature can be commodified without associated 
values being destroyed or transformed by market institutions is brought into question. In order 
for carbon credits to be exchanged on markets, carbon reductions need to be transformed into 
tradable commodities. 
“Offsets are generally commodified into saleable units through the development of 
specific emissions-reduction projects, the outputs of which can be quantified, owned, 
and traded” (Bumpus and Liverman 2008, p.134). 
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Page (2013, p.238) argues that the value of carbon offsets cannot be captured by a scheme 
based on such an economic rationale because this creates a “false commodity” that lacks the 
properties of “goods that can be owned, bought, and sold”. Even if commodification were 
possible and credible, the atmosphere is not private property but fundamentally owned by 
either all equally or no one. In either case, transferring emissions into commodified Nature 
implies a misappropriation of the atmosphere (Bumpus and Liverman 2008) and a 
transformation of the associated values from the social to the private. So the institutional 
setting of private property, competition and individual choice would crowd-out the 
motivations found under social ownership, cooperation and collective decision-making. 
 
 Ethical dimension of carbon trading 
There is only a small literature on the ethical aspects of carbon trading and the ethics of 
offsetting have seldom been explored in any depth. Influential contributions have been made 
by Goodin (1994) and Sandel (1997), who both raise objections to emissions trading as a 
general practice. Aldred (2012) discusses whether an idealised ETS could address the ethical 
objections that have been raised. More specifically, he argues against Caney (2010) who 
rejects ethical objections on the basis of the standard economists position (also taken by Page 
2013) that in theory redesign can solve all problems.4 The specific concern for ethical aspects 
of voluntary carbon trading with respect to individuals is almost absent from the literature; 
three exceptions are Spash (2010), Dhanda and Hartman (2011) and Hyams and Fawcett 
(2013). 
 
As already noted there is a strong association in the marketing of voluntary offsets with guilt 
over wrong-doing. Dhanda and Hartman (2011, p.126) cite and reference a common argument 
concerning offsets as being that: 
                                                 
4 The paper by Caney and Hepburn (2011) is a repetition of Caney (2010). 
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“There is no need to change one's personal lifestyle since consumers can ‘purchase 
forgiveness with money’. In essence, the global emissions market permits countries to 
trade emissions credits while the carbon credit market permits wealthy individuals or 
organizations to buy themselves out of responsibility to reduce emission” 
The idea of buying ones way out of an ethical responsibility may be seen as objectionable, but 
emphasising the possibility of forgiveness through a socially approved institution has its own 
appeal. This appears to be a particularly Christian aspect of the marketing approach 
employed, where some form of repentance for sin is being coded into the purchasing practice. 
In a different context, Lopez et al. (2012) provide empirical support for the idea that, in a 
Christian country, guilt and shame are important mechanisms that strengthen long-term 
cooperation. 
 
The notion of offsets being like indulgences, where a sinner could buy relief from time in 
purgatory with a payment to the Roman Catholic Church, was first discussed by Goodin 
(1994). He reviewed the practice of medieval indulgencies, arguing that these sin offsets 
enabled the wealthy to pay for their wrongdoing, allowing relief for their conscience, 
removing the need to change behaviour and avoiding the necessity for completely refraining 
from sinning. Medieval indulgencies substituted individual action to avoid wrong-doing with 
monetary transactions justifying immorality. In this way sinning was actually encouraged 
because wealthy people were provided with a quick alternative to lengthy penitence. 
Translated into “environmental indulgencies”, Goodin (1994, p.579) argues that this is the 
sale of the unsaleable, transforming the moral duty of (Christian) stewardship for Nature into 
paying money to offsets sins of environmental destruction. Thus, purchasing GHG offsets 
permits individuals to commit a sin, justifying environmental harms and removing their moral 
reprehensibility. Compensating for environmental harm through monetary payments relieves 
people from feelings of guilt and responsibility. 
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However, the extent to which GHG emissions can be regarded as similar to an act of Christian 
‘sin’ is highly questionably. Spash (2010) criticises the use of this religious perspective as 
relevant to the emission of GHGs. For instance, consider the range of GHG emitting acts 
involved that are being regarded as equally sinful, e.g. from simply lighting a fire to keep 
warm or stay alive to flying first class from London to New York to go shopping. There is a 
flaw in arguing that fundamental necessities of life that lead to GHG emissions should be 
regarded as a moral sin, e.g. releasing methane when relieving ones bowels. This changes the 
emphasis to the ethical distribution of GHG budgets and raises the question as to what 
emissions are necessary for ‘decent’ living (Rao and Baier 2012), or a meaningful/worthwhile 
life. A useful ethical distinction to draw here is between subsistence and luxury emissions 
(Shue 1993). The release of GHG emissions does not then appear morally wrong (or sinful) in 
and of itself. Instead, as argued by Spash (2002, 2010), a key ethical concern in the context of 
human induced climate change is the deliberate creation of harm of the innocent, and the 
creation of harm through avoidable, and unnecessary, actions. This raises the question as to 
what is the appropriate ethical basis for judging an act as harmfully polluting? 
 
Hyams and Fawcett (2013, p.94) argue that carbon offsetting rests on a consequentialist 
ethics; that is, the claim that acts should be judged only by their consequences. In a 
consequentialist understanding, purchasing carbon credits to offset emissions is just the same 
as not emitting carbon emissions beforehand. Different acts, by different people, in different 
times and spaces are then made commensurable. Sandel (2012) exemplifies the problems this 
can entail by comparing buying carbon offsets to being allowed to toss a can of beer into the 
Grand Canyon when paying someone else to collect waste in the Himalayas. When 
considering offsetting as a general means of addressing harm, or wrong doing, it can then 
easily be ridiculed. For example, the website “cheatneutral.com” satirically collects money 
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from people who cheat on their partners (e.g. having extra marital affairs) to pay others not to 
cheat, thus supposedly neutralising the acts of betrayal. 
 
In one respect these examples question what is being valued. That is the consequences are not 
being related to the specific act undertaken nor the specific individuals or place involved. 
There is a misappropriation of the consequences from the specific to the general. In 
philosophical terms the confusion relates to conflating the particular (de re) with values 
relating to a general function (de dicto), e.g. a specific can of beer in the Grand Canyon with 
waste in general anywhere, a specific personal act of betrayal with acts of betrayal in general 
by anyone. In another respect the applicability of consequentialist ethics itself is being 
brought into question, and so the foundation of all mainstream economic thinking. This 
implies that other dimensions of morality and different ethical systems become relevant, such 
as fairness, justice and rights (Dhanda and Hartman 2011; Hyams and Fawcett 2013). Acting 
virtuously would be another ethical approach and was indeed a reason why Martin Luther, 
and others, opposed indulgencies, i.e. buying them was divorced from the acts required of a 
virtuous person. 
 
A separate ethical issue concerning GHG emissions is their distributional dimension. Shue 
(1999), appeals to a concept of fairness in order to claim that contributions to reducing 
emissions need to be made by those better-off, irrespective of whether the existing inequality 
is justifiable. Yet, the voluntary aspect of offsets implies the exact opposite will occur because 
the poorest lack the ability to pay their way out of GHG emissions while the rich can pay the 
poor to undertake such actions. This cost shifting exercise is indeed the basis for economic 
efficiency claims and why such carbon offsetting is feasible in the first place. As Hyams and 
Fawcett (2013, p.95) state, offsetting implies that “the rich are able to continue high rates of 
emissions at the expense of emissions of the poor”. Furthermore profits made and wealth 
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created in the development of such markets and business models go to the already rich in the 
global North (Broderick 2009; Bumpus and Liverman 2008). All the above intensify and 
solidify the social order responsible for the existing inequalities in the first place (O’Neill 
2007). 
 
The International Political Economy of Carbon Offsets 
In contrast to regulated compliance markets, voluntary offset markets operate without any 
“reference to higher institutional levels of governance and free themselves from national 
boundaries or spatial constraints” (Bumpus and Liverman 2008, p.141). As a result, complex 
international relations can develop. Bumpus and Liverman (2008) exemplify this with the 
case of the company Climate Care providing funding for the conversion of cow dung to 
cooking gas used by local communities. A non-governmental organisation monitors the 
process and transfers relevant data to Climate Care, which calculates the emission reductions 
that are then sold to the United Kingdom Cooperative Bank. Multiple actors become engaged 
in management arrangements with interdependencies between partners from the Global North 
and South (Bumpus and Liverman 2008). In general, carbon offset projects largely take place 
in the global South because it is cheap to carryout projects there, while the demand for offsets 
as well as project developers are typically located in the global North (McKie et al. 2015). 
This spatial dimension to carbon offsets contains elements of unfair/unequal trade, where 
economically powerful actors in the North profit from carbon reductions in the South 
“opening the door to a new form of colonialism” (Bachram 2004, p.10). 
 
The focus of individual offset purchases is on carbon and this leads to the neglect of other 
social and ecological impacts arising from projects. There are concerns over the social 
impacts of carbon forestry projects especially on local communities. Jindal et al. (2008) and 
Lyons and Westoby (2014) provide evidence from Uganda, where international investors 
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enabled by neoliberal policies have built large scale plantation forestry for carbon 
sequestration activities. Both studies report that in the course of privatisation of forest areas 
local communities suffered negative consequences. Local villagers were regularly charged as 
illegal trespassers and heavy fines were imposed on people violating the rules. Some local 
communities reported the destruction of burial sites. Similarly, local communities did not 
benefit from the carbon revenues from the Forest Rehabilitation Project in Mt. Elgon and 
Kibale National Parks in Uganda while being partially excluded from the parks (Lang and 
Byakola 2006). Bachram (2004) reports cases where local farmers and fisher folk have been 
evicted from their lands for large scale carbon sink projects in Uganda and Brazil. 
 
Carbon offset projects can therefore add to an emerging ‘green grabbing’ problem, where land 
and ecosystem functions are increasingly appropriated for what are stated to be 
environmentally related projects, such as biofuels, biocarbon sequestration, ecotourism or 
GHG offsets (Fairhead et al. 2012). This involves the restructuring of authority and access 
rules, transforming the use and management of resources. Land is seized in the South for large 
scale monoculture plantations (e.g. palm oil), while the poor lose their land and rights to use 
formerly common property resources. Land grabbing has become a widespread problem due 
to the incentives provided to carbon project developers to make money (Bachram 2004; 
Fairhead et al. 2012; Lyons and Westoby 2014). Kollmuss et al. (2008, p.90) conclude that: 
“although carbon markets […] are intended to deliver development co-benefits for their 
host countries, these have not been widely realised. In practice, offset projects often rely 
on relatively conventional technologies, and rarely benefit poor communities with 
insufficient access to energy services”. 
Wittman and Caron (2009) in their case study on a solar electrification carbon offset project in 
Sri Lanka find that, although communities benefitted from the off grid solar technology, the 
projects produced tensions and social inequalities between communities. Such conflict arises 
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due to the replacement of non-monetary by monetary economies and the deliberate 
undermining of traditional resource management practices. 
 
The total transformation of local ecosystems can also remove traditional practices. This is 
particularly so where carbon sequestration projects are focused on fast-growing trees or single 
species plantations. Such plantations can create substantial loss of water availability and in-
stream flow as well as increasing salinisation and acidification. Plantations based on exotic 
species threaten local biodiversity and destroy native species e.g., removing the undergrowth 
that supports a range of flora and fauna (Jindal et al. 2008). Lohmann (2006a) cites cases 
where exotic species and mono-cultures were planted for forest carbon sequestration resulting 
in the loss of people’s livelihoods, changing soil conditions and increasing fires and droughts. 
Similarly, he documents several case studies covering a range of offset projects (e.g., 
biomass, gas and landfill methane combustion) that expose exploitation of local communities. 
 
Drawing on Harvey’s concept of accumulation of dispossession, Bumpus and Liverman 
(2008) argue that offsetting emissions reductions through projects in the global South can be 
interpreted as a form of neo-colonial trade relations. Emission offsets are based on the 
transformation of former public commons to private commodities and financial assets, 
implying unequal exchange between companies in the global North and communities in the 
global South. This reinforces economic inequalities by transforming what was publicly owned 
(or owned by the poor or even owned by no one) to private ownership of international 
investors (Lyons and Westoby 2014). Twyman et al. (2015) claim that carbon trading and 
offsetting arise from a specifically Eurocentric relationship with Nature, although, in fact as 
noted earlier, the concept was developed in the USA (Lohmann 2006b), and adopted later in 
Europe (Spash 2010). Still the key point is the implications of commodification for the 
conceptualisation of Nature and the imposition of a specific set of economic relationships, 
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values and understandings. Local and indigenous knowledge of Nature and approaches to 
forest management are replaced by scientific logic and top-down corporate management 
(Lyons and Westoby 2014). In communities where Nature and its elements (such as carbon) 
are not regarded as commodities, or potential commodities, for trading, offset projects 




The idea of voluntary markets for offsetting individual GHG emissions fits well within a 
neoliberal ideology. It emphasises the ability of individuals as consumers to change the world 
through their purchasing decisions. Individual responsibility for environmental harm is 
highlighted and a means offered to assuage the resulting guilt. In the process the need for 
collective action, changing behaviour, new public policies and institutional reform are all 
undermined. 
 
Despite their fast growth voluntary carbon markets appear at best a dubious means for 
addressing human induced climate change, even if purely a supplement to government policy. 
Yet there appears to be a lack of critical reflection as to their operation despite a series 
fundamental problems. We have identified two broad sets of issues. One is the validity of 
carbon markets in their own terms as a means for achieving the control of GHGs to prevent 
human induced climate change. The other is the political economy of such markets, their role 
as social institutions impacting individual behaviour and embedding it within a capitalist and 
formal economic logic that has implications for international resource exchange and the geo-
political order. 
 
Clear quality and additionality standards for voluntary carbon offsets are missing. Existing 
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standards vary in scope and rigour, appear inconsistent and/or difficult to assess. There is no 
mandatory structure that binds offset providers to a particular standard. Purchasers of carbon 
offsets are unable to obtain reliable information on additionality, as well as the social and 
ecological integrity of carbon offsets. The average purchaser of offsets is left with a variety of 
providers and standards with unclear quality differences. The ideal of consumer choice as an 
informed decision appears highly susceptible to violation and purchasers also cannot be 
assumed to have the technical literacy necessary to judge the qualities of different carbon 
offsets. This raises the question as to why individuals buy offsets? 
 
That the individuals targeted by offset providers are liable to be only moderately concerned 
environmentalists, who are preoccupied by personal image but feel guilty over their 
materialist lifestyles, means a further absence of scrutiny as to offset quality. Crowding-out of 
intrinsic motivation means the net outcome may be worse in terms of overall GHG emissions. 
The ethical critiques of voluntary carbon markets question their basis in consequentialist 
reasoning and raise the importance of fairness, justice and rights. That voluntary carbon 
trading also involves concerns over negative effects on indigenous and local communities in 
the Global South, not least through land grabbing, adds to the list of issues. 
 
Overall the idea that markets can be independently established to address environmental 
problems appears totally fallacious. Rather markets are structured institutions that require 
social regulation like all institutions by which humans attempt to cooperate and coordinate 
their activities. What the problems we have presented reveal is that other institutions may 
actually be both more efficient and more effective as well as providing a direct means of 
achieving social and ecological goals. Perhaps most importantly the idea of ‘solving’ the 
climate crisis through unregulated markets leads to a set of value commitments being adopted 
in public practice as ‘normal’ which assuage psychological conflicts but do not address the 
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biophysical reality of climate change. Human behaviour in a price-making market comes with 
a set of self-justifications that appear to be the antithesis of what is necessary to achieve an 
informed responsibility for taking joint communal action to implement the social ecological 
transformation necessary to prevent human induced climate change. 
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